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WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW
(1902); George v. Village of Chester, 202 N.Y. 398, 95 N.E. 767 (1911); State v.
Morse, 84 Vt. 387, 80 Atl. 189 (1911). This is also the rule set out in 1. WIET, WATm
RIGHTS IN THE WESTERN STATES 803 (3d ed. 1911).
The common law rules on riparian rights are the law in Washington, Benton v.
Johncox, 17 Wash. 277, 49 Pac. 495 (1897), but this state has also long subscribed to
the doctrine of appropriation. See Horowitz, Riparian and Appropriation Rights to the
Use of Water in Washington, 7 WASH. L. REV. 197 (1932). The water code of
1917, REM. REv. STAT. § 7351 et. seq. [P.P.C. § 993-1 et seq.], provides that rights in
publicly owned waters shall be acquired only by appropriation, and permits private per-
sons to exercise the right of eminent domain to condemn inferior uses of water for a
use that is declared by the statute to be public in nature. Since riparian rights are
valuable property rights, Litka v. Anacortes, 167 Wash. 259, 9 P. 2d 88 (1932), just
compensation must be made when they are taken in the appropriation through the
exercise of eminent domain. WASH. CoNsT. ART. I, § 16.
One line of Washington decisions would seem, at first glance, to preclude the rule
of the instant case. In 1923 the court held that riparian rights do not attach to surplus
waters, i.e., those in excess of the amount which can be beneficially used by the
riparian owner for irrigation and domestic purposes, either directly or within a rea-
sonable time. Brown v. Chase, 125 Wash. 542, 217 Pac. 23 (1923). This rule was
applied to a nonnavigable lake in the case of Proctor v. Sim, 134 Wash. 606, 236 Pac.
114 (1925). The water involved in the instant case clearly fits this definition of "sur-
plus," but the holdings are distinguishable. The earlier two cases held that riparian
rights involving quantitative takings of water extended only to the volume which could
beneficially be used for irrigation and domestic purposes, while the instant case dealt
with riparian rights to use the body of water without removing any part of it.
In 1929 the court edged closer to the instant holding by deciding that when an
appropriation would lower a lake level and expose riparian land previously submerged,
the appropriator would have to proceed by eminent domain and compensate the owners
for damage to a riparian right. Martha Lake Water Co. v. Nelson, 152 Wash. 53,
277 Pac. 382 (1929). While the court expressly stated the injury would result from
lowering the lake level, it added the "owners purchased their property because of its
access to the water for bathing, boating, swimming, fishing and for summer homes....
The riparian land is chiefly valuable for the purposes mentioned." Martha Lake Water
Co. v. Nelson, supra, 152 Wash. at 54, 277 Pac. at 382. By inference these uses were
recognized as riparian rights. The rule in the Martha Lake case was reaffirmed three
years later by Litka v. Anacortes, supra.
Thus the instant case is the first direct holding in this state that bathing and
boating are riparian rights. While the rule creates an acute problem for smaller water
districts whose only feasible source of water is a nonnavigable lake or stream, it is
nonetheless a realistic rule in view of the considerable effect these activities have on
riparian land values.
G. KEITH GRIM
Evidence-Witnesses--Proof of Prior Inconsistent Statements. D was convicted of
second degree assault. The prosecuting attorney, ostensibly for the purpose of laying
a foundation for impeachment, asked D questions concerning D's prior inconsistent
statements, using a purported manuscript of a wire recording. D neither confirmed
nor denied making the statements, answering, "I don't know" or "I don't deny it or
confirm it." The prosecutor failed to follow this up on rebuttal by proving or attempting
to prove that the prior statements were actually made. Appellant contended this was
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error. Held: Conviction reversed. Such conduct was extremely prejudicial and con-
stituted reversible error. State v. Yoakum, 137 Wash. Dec. 129, 222 P. 2d 181 (1950).
Where a witness denies having made the alleged contradictory statement, a failure
subsequently to prove that it was made is obviously prejudicial. The prosecutor in
effect vouches that the prior statements were made, and thus becomes an impressive
witness to the jury, though the matter is hearsay. Hence such statements must be
proved. Hash v. State, 48 Ariz. 43, 59 P. 2d 305 (1936) ; Thurmond v. State, 57 Okla.
Crim. 388, 48 P. 2d 845 (1935) ; Phila. & R. Ry. Co. v. Bartsch, 9 F. 2d 858 (1925).
Where a witness admits making contradictory statements, the rule is that it is not
error to exclude proof of the making of such statements by other evidence because
such evidence is only cumulative. Qutayle v. Knox, 175 Wash. 182, 27 P. 2d 115 (1933);
Black v. State, 82 Tex. Cr. R. 358, 198 S.W. 959 (1917).
Where the witness neither admits nor denies making the prior statement, the rule
is that proof of such statements may be introduced at the option of counsel, Hancock
v. Bevins, 135 Kan. 195, 9 P. 2d 634 (1932) ; People v. Preston, 341 Ill. 407, 173 N.E.
383 (1930) ; Humpolack v. State, 175 Ark. 786, 300 S.W. 426 (1928), for the reason
that such proof furthers the process of impeachment, and that only an unequivocal
admission should serve as a basis for exclusion. Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. Co. v. Har-
relson, 14 F. 2d 893 (1926).
The Washington court is the first court to decide whether, when a witness gives
an equivocal answer, a failure to offer proof is error. The decision is that proof must
be offered. In support of this proposition the court cites only those cases in which the
witness has denied making the statement. From this it appears that the court has taken
the position that an equivocal answer is, in effect a denial. Other courts in permitting
such proof have indicated that such an answer is more in the nature of an admission
than a denial. It is submitted that the latter position has the sounder logical basis in
view of the transparent falseness of such answers as "I don't remember," or "I don't
deny it or confirm it," and that in the instant case the rule governing denials should
not have been applied.
JA3.ms M. TAYLoR
Master and Servant-Liability of Master for Injuries Inflicted by Incompetent Serv-
ant-Respondeat Superior and Original Negligence. The owner of an apartment
house employed a manager who, in the exercise of his duties, employed a janitor.
Thereafter, the janitor became drunk and assaulted a tenant. The trial court expressly
found that this fact was communicated to the manager who nevertheless continued to
employ the janitor. There was no express finding that any information concerning the
dangerous propensities of the janitor was communicated to the owner. However, the
trial court found generally that both the owner and manager were negligent in retaining
,the janitor in "their employ." Shortly after the first assault the janitor assaulted P,
also a tenant. This assault did not occur in the course of the janitor's employment. The
trial court awarded P judgment against both the manager and the owner. On appeal,
Held: Affirmed. Liability of both the owner and the manager is based on original
negligence, not on the respondeat superior doctrine. LaLone v. Smith et at., 139 Wash.
Dec. 152, 234 P. 2d 893 (1951).
Inasmuch as the defendants did not assign as error the trial court's findings of fact,
the decision is undoubtedly correct. Although the conclusion of fact that both de-
fendants were negligent stood unchallenged on the appeal, there appears to be no
justification for such a conclusion insofar as the owner was concerned. In order for
the owner to be guilty of negligence in retaining a dangerous employee, personal
